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The spatial arrangement of individuals is thought to overcome the dilemma of cooperation: When
cooperators engage in clusters they might share the benefit of cooperation while being more protected
against non-cooperating individuals, which benefit from cooperation but save the cost of cooperation.
This is paradigmatically shown by the spatial prisoner’s dilemma model. Here, we study this model
in one and two spatial dimensions, but explicitly take into account that in biological setups fitness
collection and selection are separated processes occurring mostly on vastly different time scales.
This separation is particularly important to understand the impact of mobility on the evolution of
cooperation. We find that even small diffusive mobility strongly restricts cooperation since it enables
non-cooperative individuals to invade cooperative clusters. Thus, in most biological scenarios, where
the mobility of competing individuals is an irrefutable fact, the spatial prisoner’s dilemma alone
cannot explain stable cooperation but additional mechanisms are necessary for spatial structure
to promote the evolution of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is analyzed in detail. We
confirm the existence of a phase transition, here controlled by mobility and costs, which distinguishes
between purely cooperative and non-cooperative absorbing states. While in one dimension the model
is in the class of the Voter Model, it belongs to the Directed Percolation (DP) universality class in
two dimensions.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 05.40.-a, 64.60.ah, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
While cooperative behavior is ubiquitous in nature, it
is puzzling to understand from an evolutionary perspec-
tive: free-riders benefit from cooperation but save the
costs to provide a public good and hence have a fitness
advantage compared to cooperators [1, 2]. To overcome
this dilemma of cooperation, additional mechanisms must
be effective which select for cooperators. One impor-
tant mechanism is the spatial clustering of cooperators
where cooperators preferentially interact with other co-
operators [3–6]. This is illustrated by the spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma [4, 7] where, in contrast to its famous
well-mixed variant [1, 2], individuals are arranged on a
lattice and only interact with their nearest neighbors.
Hence fitness explicitly depends on the composition of
the neighborhood. Many different studies, employing a
variety of deterministic and stochastic interaction rules,
have confirmed that the formation of cooperative clus-
ters can promote cooperation in such setups, see e.g.
Refs. [8–17]. This was also found for complex spatial
structures like networks [18–25]. Spatial clustering has
also been studied experimentally. For example, Le Gac et
al. [26] have found in experiments with toxin-producing
E. coli that cooperation can also be maintained through
cluster formation in a viscous environment and the de-
gree of diffusion of the public good can be crucial for
the evolutionary outcome. Theoretical studies also show
that there can be a critical phase-transition into a purely
cooperative state if costs fall below a certain threshold
value [27–29].
Importantly, however, in spatial setups mobility can
strongly challenge the evolution of cooperation [3]. This
is in agreement with recent studies by Chiong and Kir-
ley [30], who found a statistically not significant enhance-
ment of cooperation for small mobility, and a strong re-
duction for intermediate mobility. For the spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma, complex forms of mobility relying on
more sophisticated abilities, like success driven mobility,
have been shown to promote cooperation [31–34]. How-
ever, undirected mobility (i.e. diffusion), ubiquitous in
biological situations, fosters the invasion of free-riders
into cooperative clusters and thereby strongly counter-
acts the evolution of cooperation. Thus if undirected
mobility threatens cooperation and mobility is undeni-
ably a part of biological reality, this raises the question
how fundamental spatial clustering as a mechanism to
explain cooperation really is.
In this manuscript we investigate the impact of dif-
fusive mobility on the level of cooperation and analyze
the critical mobility where cooperation breaks down. To
study this question, an understanding of the biological
origin of fitness is crucial. While fitter individuals are se-
lected for over many generations, fitness itself is the result
of a multitude of different more microscopic processes like
nutrient uptake or metabolic processes, which occur on
much shorter time scales than reproduction. For exam-
ple, when iron is lacking in the environment, cooperative
strains of the proteobacteria Pseudomonas aeruginosa
produce iron-scavenging molecules (siderophores) [35].
Released into the environment these molecules can ef-
ficiently bind single iron atoms and form complexes that
can then be taken up by surrounding bacteria. Associ-
2ated with the metabolic costs and benefits, the fitness of
an individual changes with every siderophore production
and iron-uptake process. However, reproduction and se-
lection of fitter individuals only occurs after many such
processes, on a longer time scale. This biologically more
realistic origin of fitness has been mostly neglected in
previous models by regarding fitness collection and repro-
duction as simultaneous events. In a population where
building up fitness is a life-long dynamic process (fitness
collection), the individuals’ mobility plays a particularly
crucial role as the individuals’ fitness strongly depends
on the neighborhoods which they inhabit during their
life span.
We here study a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game and
explicitly take fitness collection dynamics into account.
With this formulation we are able to reproduce the ex-
pected limits. For vanishing mobility, we observe cluster-
ing and the typical spatial prisoner’s dilemma dynamics.
In contrast, for high mobility, we recover the dynamics
of the replicator equation for the well-mixed prisoner’s
dilemma. The transition between these scenarios is not
smooth but separated by a critical non-equilibrium phase
transition: Below critical costs and mobility values only
cooperators remain in the long run while above only free-
riders persist.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
Consider Nd individuals occupying the sites of a reg-
ular d-dimensional square lattice with a linear extension
N and periodic boundary conditions. Each individual is
either a cooperator (C) or free-rider (F ) and individu-
als only interact with their nearest neighbors. [61]. In
contrast to common dynamical formulations of the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma [4, 5, 7, 8], we drop the assump-
tion of a coupled payoff-collection and selection step and
thereby take into account that both processes in general
occur on vastly different time-scales. Taken together, our
model considers three different reaction steps which can
occur at distinct rates. We chose our time unit τ = 1 as
the average lifetime of an individual when the selection
is neutral (i.e. when the fitness of all individuals is 1),
see below [62]. The rates are then defined as the average
number of steps occurring per unit time τ .
Payoff collection occurs at a per capita rate r. An
individual engages in a pairwise interaction with one of
its randomly chosen nearest neighbors. When the chosen
neighbors are distinct, the cooperator C collects a payoff
−c due to the costs of cooperation while the free-rider F
receives the benefit b > c > 0. When the neighbors are
both cooperators or both free-riders they receive a payoff
b− c and 0, respectively. The payoff collection process of
each individual continues during the whole course of its
life, and the collected fitness fj of an individual j at a
certain time is given by the collected payoff the individual
has received up to that time,
fj = 1 +
1
n
n∑
l=1
p
(l)
j . (1)
Here, n denotes the number of interactions individual
j encountered. p
(l)
j denotes the payoff for individual j
received during the l-th interaction with another indi-
vidual. In addition, a background fitness of 1 describes
impacts on the fitness which are the same for each in-
dividual. We also implemented an alternative model, in
which only the last nmax interaction steps contribute to
the fitness. This is a possible implementation for a bi-
ological situation in which interactions from the distant
past do not contribute to the present fitness; nmax can
be seen as a memory range. A short memory range can
significantly change the outcome, but if nmax ≫ 1, the
results are equivalent to the model without memory lim-
itation. The impact of this alternative model of fitness
collection will be further discussed below.
For the rest of the paper, we take a fixed collection rate
r ≡ 5, i.e. the collection rate is chosen significantly larger
than the reproduction timescale. Actually, for many bi-
ological situations, r ≫ 1 is expected [35]. However, our
qualitative findings are robust under the choice of r.
Reproduction and selection is given by the replacement
of one individual j by a new individual belonging to the
other type. Importantly, the rate for such a replacement
event to occur depends on the type of the individual j,
and the fitness of its nearest neighbors. For specificity, we
take the corresponding transition rate for an individual
j at a site xj as the fitness of its neighbors i ∈ {1, ..., ν}
with the opposite strategy times the probability 1/ν of
an interaction with them:
aC→F (j) = sj
1
ν
ν∑
i=1
fi · (1− si), (2a)
aF→C(j) = (1− sj)
1
ν
ν∑
i=1
fi · si. (2b)
Here, sl = 0 individual l is a free-rider and sl = 1 if
individual l is a cooperator. If the neighbor at site xi
belongs to the same type as the individual at site xj ,
this neighbor does not contribute to the replacement rate
a→(j). Conversely, if it belongs to the other type, it
increases the replacement rate of j by its fitness fi. If a
selection event has taken place, we assume that the new
individual starts with zero fitness [63].
Mobility is taken to be independent of fitness collection
and selection dynamics. An individual interchanges its
position with one of its randomly chosen nearest neigh-
bors with a per capita hopping rate M . If ℓ is the
lattice spacing, this corresponds to a macroscopic dif-
fusion constant of D = ℓ2M in one dimension, and
D = 12ℓ
2M in two dimensions. While payoff-collection
and mobility events per individual occur with constant
rates r andM , respectively, the rate for a selection event,
3aC→F (j) + aF→C(j), depends both on the life history of
the interacting individuals and the composition of the
local neighborhood. The time evolution of the system is
determined by a Markov process ensuing from the rates
for the various processes introduced above. To inves-
tigate the dynamics we performed extensive stochastic
simulations of the underlying time-continuous stochastic
process employing the Gillespie algorithm [36].
III. SIMULATION DYNAMICS AND
QUALITATIVE BEHAVIOUR
In the following, we first consider the evolutionary dy-
namics for the limits of vanishing and large mobility be-
fore considering intermediate mobilities and the ensuing
absorbing state phase transition.
In the limit of large mobility, M → ∞, the popula-
tion is well-mixed and spatial degrees of freedom can be
neglected. In particular, an individual interacts with all
other individuals with equal probability and thus samples
payoff values from interactions with the whole popula-
tion. Hence, for a given overall fraction x of cooperators
in the population, the expected fitness value fj of an in-
dividual j is site-independent, and for cooperators resp.
free-riders given by
fC = 1 + x(b − c) + (1− x)(−c), (3a)
fF = 1 + xb. (3b)
Replacement of individuals occurs according to the ex-
pected replacement rates. With Eqs. (2), they are given
by 〈aC→F 〉 = x(1−x)fF and 〈aF→C〉 = x(1−x)fC . The
expected change of the global fraction of cooperators is
thus given by
∂tx = 〈aF→C〉 − 〈aC→F 〉 = −cx(1 − x). (4)
This is the common replicator dynamics of the prisoner’s
dilemma in a well-mixed population [2]; due to the costs
c of cooperation only free-riders survive in the long run.
For a more complete description of the well-mixed sys-
tem, fluctuations due to the finite size of the system (fi-
nite N) and an effectively limited payoff collection step
(finite n) can be taken into account [37–41].
Here we consider the fully stochastic dynamics of the
spatially extended system. Fig. 1 shows typical time evo-
lution scenarios of the one-dimensional game for the limit
of vanishing mobility, M = 0, and Fig. 2 depicts different
snapshots of the two-dimensional dynamics in the same
limit. When starting with a random initial configura-
tion of the lattice with an average cooperator fraction
of x0 = 0.5, first compact clusters of cooperators and
free-riders are formed after few generations. As implied
by the definition of the selection rates, Eq. (2), there are
no transitions between different types within clusters but
only at the domain boundaries between cooperator and
free-rider clusters. There, the dynamics is determined by
two antagonistic effects. On the one hand, cooperators
time t 
(a)
(b)
(c)
c = 0.1
c = 0.348
c = 0.5
FIG. 1: (Color online) Lattice occupation (vertical axis)
versus time (horizontal axis) of the one-dimensional dynamics
for vanishing mobility, M = 0. The lattice size was N =
500. Starting with a random distribution of 50% cooperators
[dark grey (blue)] and 50% free-riders [light grey (red)] on
the lattice, clusters are formed. Preferentially, the clusters
of one type grow, such that only cooperators or only free-
riders remain in the end. (a) the cooperation costs c are 0.1.
For these low costs cooperators take over the population. (b)
c = 0.347, the cooperation costs are very close to the critical
value c0. The cluster extension and the cluster lifetime both
show a power-law divergence as c→ c0 for increasing N . (c)
c = 0.5, for high costs cooperators die out and only free-riders
survive.
(a) t = 0 (b) t = 4 (c) t = 36
FIG. 2: (Color online) Snapshots of the two-dimensional
lattice and cluster formation for vanishing mobility, M = 0
at different times t. Starting with a random distribution of
half cooperators [dark grey (blue)] and half free-riders [light
grey (red)] on the lattice (a), clusters are formed (b). Pref-
erentially, the clusters of one type grow (c), such that only
cooperators or only free-riders remain in the end. This simu-
lation was performed on a 100 × 100 lattice, the cooperation
costs were c = 0.1.
at the boundary benefit from the neighboring coopera-
tors within their cluster, and from their previous inter-
actions. On the other hand, a free-riding individual still
has a fitness advantage by saving the costs for providing
cooperation. From our numerical simulations we observe
that for a benefit b = 1, the costs of cooperation have to
be lower than a critical value, c0 = 0.3471±0.0008 in one
dimension and c0 = 0.163±0.0005 in two dimensions, for
cooperators to persist, see Fig. 3 (a) and (b). Through-
out the rest of this manuscript we take the benefit b = 1
as fixed. Other values for b do not lead to qualitative
changes of the model.
For the alternative implementation of the payoff collec-
tion, where only the last nmax payoff collection steps con-
4(a) d = 1
(b) d = 2
FIG. 3: (Color online) Stationary fraction x of cooperators as
a function of the costs of cooperation c and the mobilityM for
(a) the one-dimensional and (b) the two-dimensional model.
There is a phase transition between stationary states where
only cooperation [dark grey (blue)] or only non-cooperation
[light grey (red)] prevails. N = 500 in (a), N = 100 in (b).
tribute to the fitness, the qualitative dynamics remained
unchanged as long as nmax was greater than 1. But im-
portantly, cooperators always died out in one dimension
if only the last payoff collection step was remembered
(nmax = 1). Therefore, in a one-dimensional system the
memory of past interactions is an essential mechanism for
the support of cooperation, and spatial structure alone
cannot promote cooperation: in one dimension, both a
cooperator and a free-rider at a domain wall always inter-
act with exactly one cooperator and one free-rider. If just
the payoff from such a configuration is remembered, the
free-rider at the domain wall will on the average always
be fitter than the cooperator (if the cooperation costs
c are greater than zero). However, if past interactions
are remembered, a cooperator that has been inside of its
cluster for a long time has acquired a high average payoff
from these past interactions. Such a cooperator will not
suffer too much from few interactions with a free-rider
when it comes to a domain wall. In turn, a free-rider
that has been within its cluster very long has also a very
low fitness. Memory effects can therefore strengthen co-
operation and are crucial for the cooperator survival in
one dimension. In two dimensions, on the other hand,
spatial structure alone can maintain cooperation, even
without memory effects (i.e. even if nmax = 1). A coop-
erator at a domain wall can get a benefit from up to three
cooperating neighbors from its cluster if the domain wall
is linear. An advantageous domain wall can make mu-
tual cooperation beneficial and protect cooperators if the
costs c are not too high.
However, cooperation is unstable under the influence of
mobility, both in one and in two dimensions. The inter-
change in position of neighboring individuals disturbs the
formation of sharply separated clusters. With increasing
mobility M , cluster boundaries become more and more
blurred. As a consequence, cooperators are surrounded
by fewer and fewer peers and thereby lose their advan-
tage of interacting in a highly cooperative neighborhood.
Cooperativity therefore strongly decays when M is in-
creased. Remarkably, we find that there is a critical
phase transition separating phases where only cooper-
ators or only free-riders are expected to persist in the
long run. While for sufficiently high mobility and costs
only free-riders remain, cooperation is the only surviv-
ing strategy when mobility and costs fall below critical
values. Thus in either case the stationary state of the
dynamics is an absorbing state. The phase diagrams for
the one- and for the two-dimensional model are shown in
Fig. 3(a) and (b), respectively. Other than in previous
Prisoner’s Dilemma models [27–29], no fluctuating active
phase with coexistence of cooperators and free-riders was
observed. The decay of the critical costs cM with M is
found to be very strong for unbiased mobility(cf. Fig. 3(a)
and (b)), threatening cooperation even if each individual
performs only a couple diffusion steps per lifetime (i.e. if
M is only O(1) and comparable in size with the repro-
duction rate).
IV. CLUSTER APPROXIMATION FOR
CRITICAL COSTS
The population dynamics is mainly governed by pro-
cesses occurring at the boundaries between domains dom-
inated by cooperators and free-riders, respectively. In
this section, we give a simplified analysis for the dynam-
ics of theses domain walls and thereby approximately cal-
culate the critical costs c0 below which cooperators can
survive. The schematics of the simplified domain wall
picture is shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b) for the one- and two-
dimensional case, respectively. For the one-dimensional
case we consider an isolated domain wall, and reduce the
dynamics to the two boundary sites between a cooperator
and a free-rider domain, and consider the remainder of
both domains to be static. The possible configurations of
the domain wall boundary are illustrated by Fig. 4 a1–a4.
Among others, this scheme neglects events where domain
walls are created or annihilated. Similarly, for the two-
dimensional lattice, we constrain the dynamics to the im-
5mediate vicinity of the domain wall and consider a 2× 2
section at the domain wall boundary whose possible con-
figurations are shown in Figs. 4 b1–b10. The remainder of
the domain wall is considered as a static horizontal front.
Again, these assumptions leave out many other possible
processes changing the domain wall boundaries. Never-
theless, such a strongly simplified model seems to retain
the most essential features of the domain wall dynamics,
since the estimates for the critical costs c0 are in good
agreement with the simulation results (see below).
FIG. 4: (Color online) Illustration of a simplified domain wall
picture for the one-dimensional (a), and two-dimensional (b)
lattice. The domain wall dynamics is constrained to the white
area where transitions between all possible arrangements of
cooperators [dark grey (blue)] and free-riders [light grey (red)]
are possible, as indicated in the graphs.The configuration of
cooperators and free-riders outside of the white area is con-
sidered to remain static. The one-dimensional domain wall
has moved forward or backward if the dynamic sites in the
white area are in the all-cooperator state a3 or the all-free-
rider state a4, respectively. Similarly, the section considered
for the two-dimensional domain wall has moved forward or
backward if the dynamic sites are in states b9 or b10, respec-
tively.
We start our analysis with the one-dimensional model.
The dynamics of the domain wall is then governed by
transitions between the four states a1, ..., a4, which oc-
cur at rates determined by Eqs. (2a) and (2b) and the
history of each individual. We resort to a mean-field
picture and aim to derive a rate equation, ~˙v = T · ~v,
which determines the time evolution of the probabilities
~v := (a1(t), ..., a4(t)) to find one of these four configura-
tions. Let us first assume that each individual collects
the payoff from all of its neighbors, such that the fitness
of each individual can be approximated by the mean pay-
off received from its neighborhood. The transition rates
between different configurations can then be calculated
from Eq. (2). For example, the transition from a2 to a3
occurs if the free-rider in configuration a2 turns into a
cooperator. According to Eq. (2), the rate for this to
happen is the fitness of the cooperating left and right
neighbors, fleft/right, times the probability
1
2 that a par-
ticular neighbor is chosen:
T32 =
1
2 (fleft + fright) =
5
4 − c. (5)
Under the assumption, that these neighbors have pre-
viously collected equal amounts of fitness from both of
its neighbors (1 is the neutral fitness, 1 − c is the pay-
off from a cooperating neighbor, −c is the payoff from
a free-riding neighbor), the fitness for the right and
left neighbor can be calculated. Since the left neigh-
bor is surrounded by a cooperator and a free-rider its
collected fitness is fleft = 1 +
1
2 [(1− c) + (−c)]. Simi-
larly, since the right neighbor is surrounded by two free-
riders it gets a payoff of −c from both of them such that
fright = 1 +
1
2 [(−c) + (−c)]. Analogous calculations for
the remaining transitions rates lead to the following tran-
sition matrix T :
T =


− 32 +
c
2 0
3
4
3
4 −
c
2
0 −3 + c 0 0
3
4 −
c
2
5
4 − c −
3
4 0
3
4
7
4 0 −
3
4 +
c
2

 . (6)
The stationary probability vector is given by T · ~v∗ = 0.
Whether the domain wall mainly moves forward or back-
ward is determined by the difference between the sta-
tionary values of the all-cooperator state a3 and the all-
free-rider state a4. The sign determines whether coop-
erators or free-riders finally take over the whole pop-
ulation. Calculating the null-vector ~v∗ we find that
a3 − a4 =
1
9 (4c
2 − 12c) which is strictly negative un-
less c = 0. Therefore, if we can assume that the fitness of
each individual is given by the mean payoff, the critical
costs for cooperation is c0 = 0. This result reemphasizes
that spatial structure alone cannot promote cooperation
in one dimension. However, as we know from our nu-
merical analysis in the previous section, memory effects
– not taken into account so far – can actually promote
cooperation.
Within the framework of the simple model depicted in
Fig. 4 infinite memory can be incorporated by assigning
to the individuals in the static clusters a fixed fitness of
2 − c and 1 for cooperators and free-riders, respectively.
The underlying assumption is that these static players
have been inside of their respective cluster for a long
time and have not interacted much with the opposing
strategy. For example, consider a static cooperator that
has been inside of its cluster during the last n−1 (n≫ 1)
interaction steps, and finally ends up at the domain wall,
where it interacts with a free-rider once. The fitness of
such a cooperator would then according to Eq. (1) be
given by fC = 1 +
1
n [(n − 1)(1 − c) − c]. If the number
of previous interactions within a cluster is assumed to be
very large for individuals in static clusters, their fitness
6can therefore be approximated 2−c and 1 for cooperators
and free-riders, respectively. With this assumption for
static players, the transition rate from a2 to a3 now reads
1
2 (2 − c) +
1
2 (1 +
−c
2 +
−c
2 ) =
3
2 − c. This is similar to
the above calculation but the static cooperator left of the
free-rider in a2 is now assumed to have a fitness of 2− c.
With this modification, the transition matrix becomes
T =


− 32 +
c
2 0
1
2 1− c
0 −3 + c 0 0
3
4 −
c
2
3
2 − c −
1
2 0
3
4
3
2 0 −1 + c

 . (7)
Now we find that in the stationary state a3 − a4 = 1 −
10
3 c+
4
3c
2, which implies a critical cost of c0 =
5−√13
4 ≈
0.3486. This value is in good agreement both with the
phase diagram Fig. 3(a) and with the numerical value
for the critical costs determined by finite-size scaling (see
table 1).
In two dimensions, spatial structure alone can provide
a mechanism for the survival of cooperation and therefore
memory effects do not need to be taken into account. The
calculation of the transition rates between the ten differ-
ent configurations illustrated in Fig. 4(b) is analogous to
the one-dimensional case. For example, a transition be-
tween b1 and b5 occurs if either one of the two cooperators
in configuration b1 turns into a free-rider. In each of these
two cases there is a probability of 14 that for the given co-
operator a free-rider is chosen as an interaction partner.
The fitness of which is 1 + 14 since it has one cooperator
but three free-riders as its neighbors. Taken together, the
transition rate reads T51 = 2
1
4 (1 +
1
4 ) =
5
8 . Transitions
between the various configurations bi may also occur due
to hopping events. These were disregarded in our dis-
cussion of the one-dimensional case. Here, we take those
events into account in the limit of small mobility rates; for
large mobilities clusters become more and more blurred
and the cluster approximation is not applicable. As an
example, consider the transition from b7 to b8, which is
a purely diffusive transition. The transition rate is 24M ,
where 2M is the rate at which either the free-rider in b7
or its lower cooperating neighbor are chosen for a mobil-
ity step, and 14 is the probability that the other neighbor
(the free-rider, if the cooperator was previously chosen,
and vice versa) is picked for swapping places
T =


− 32+
c
2−M 0
M
2 0
19
16−
3c
4 0
17
16 0 0 0
0 −3+c−M M2 0
3
8−
c
4
17
16−
3c
4
3
8
19
16 0 0
M M − 418 +
3c
2 −
3M
2 M 0
13
16−
c
2 0
13
16 0 0
0 0 M2 −
9
2+
3c
2 −M 0
1
4−
c
4 0
1
2 0 0
5
8 1
25
16 0 −
37
16+c−
M
2
M
2 0 0 0
13
8 −c
0 716
7
8
9
4
M
2 −
57
16+
3c
2 −
M
2 0 0 0 0
7
8−
c
2
5
4−
3c
4
23
16−c 0 0 0 −
35
16+
c
2−
M
2
M
2
11
8 0
0 516−
c
4
5
4−
c
2
9
4−
3c
2 0 0
M
2 −
65
16+c−
M
2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 34−
c
2
25
16−c −
11
8 0
0 0 0 0 34
23
16 0 0 0 −
13
8 +c


The condition that no movement of the front occurs in
the stationary state, i.e. that b9 − b10 = 0, leads to an
approximate numerical solution for the critical costs cM ,
which is shown as a green line in Fig. 2(b).
V. CRITICAL BEHAVIOR AT THE
ABSORBING STATE PHASE TRANSITION
In the following, we investigate the critical behavior
at the absorbing state phase transition. To this end, we
analyze the formation, dynamics and annihilation of clus-
ters. We recorded the life-time Tα of each cluster α, as
well as the maximum linear extension (arbitrary direc-
tion), Lα, during its life-time. These measured lengths
and lifetimes are expected to scale the same way as the
characteristic lengths and times of the system [42]. We
further logged the cumulative mass mα of each cluster
during its life time, i.e. the number of individuals be-
longing to the cluster at focus, integrated over its whole
life-time. Initial conditions where such that each site
was randomly occupied by either a cooperator or a free-
rider with the same probability 0.5. All measurements
were performed for clusters doomed to extinction: For
the phase where only cooperators prevail, we regarded
only free-riding clusters and vice versa.
In order to obtain the typical temporal extension, ξ‖,
and the typical linear extension, ξ⊥, we weighted the
measured maximal extensions of all clusters α with their
respective cluster masses [43],
ξ‖ ∼
∑
αmαTα∑
αmα
, and ξ⊥ ∼
∑
αmαLα∑
αmα
. (8)
Close to the phase transition, the typical time and length
scales are expected to behave like power laws with certain
exponents ν‖ and ν⊥ [42], respectively. However, due to
the finite system size, these typical scales do not diverge
at the critical point but, close to the critical point, are
cut-off by finite size effects. Close to the critical point and
for large enough system sizes one expects the following
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FIG. 5: One-dimensional model: Finite size scaling for varied costs c at (a) M = 0, (b) M = 0.5. ∆ = |c − cM |. With the
determined exponents ν±‖ and ν
±
⊥ , and the critical costs [cM = 0.347±0.0008 in case (a) and cM = 0.3620±0.0004 in case (b)],
the data for ξ‖ and ξ⊥ at different system sizes collapsed onto the master curves F
± and G±, see main text.
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FIG. 6: Two-dimensional model: Finite size scaling for varied costs c at (a) M = 0, (b) M = 0.5. ∆ = |c − cM |. With the
determined exponents ν±‖ and ν
±
⊥ , and the critical costs [cM = 0.163±0.0005 in case (a) and cM = 0.1605±0.0007 in case (b)],
the data for ξ‖ and ξ⊥ at different system sizes collapsed onto the master curves F
± and G±, see main text.
finite size scaling behavior for ξ‖ and ξ⊥ [44]:
ξ‖ ∼ ∆
−ν‖F±(∆N
1
ν⊥ ), (9a)
ξ⊥ ∼ ∆−ν⊥G±(∆N
1
ν⊥ ). (9b)
Here, ∆ := |c − cM | denotes the distance from the
mobility-dependent critical costs cM , and F
± and G±
signify the scaling functions below (−) and above (+)
the critical point.
As discussed before, the costs c and the mobility M
control the phase transition, cf. Fig. 3. We analyzed the
phase transition for fixed mobilities M under variation
of the costs c. We measured ξ‖ and ξ⊥ for different lat-
tice sizes and used the results to estimate the critical
8exponents ν‖ and ν⊥. We achieved this by using finite
size scaling, Eqs. (9), i.e. by adjusting the exponents
ν‖, ν⊥ and the critical point cM to optimize data col-
lapse. In one dimension we performed simulations for
linear lattice sizes N = {800, 1600, 3200, 6400}, and in
two dimensions for N = {100, 150, 200, 300}: the ensu-
ing scaling functions are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 for
the one-dimensional and two-dimensional model, respec-
tively. We then determined the critical exponents β and
β′ by fitting the cooperator fraction x(t) to the relation
x(t) ∼ t−β/ν‖ (10)
and the survival probability P (t) to the relation
P (t) ∼ t−β
′/ν‖ , (11)
which are valid at the critical point cM [44].
We roughly estimated the error of the exponents by
varying the exponents in the fitting procedure, consider-
ing the scaling functions for small and large arguments:
For the optimal fitting, all data points lie within cer-
tain intervals around the (approximately) linear scaling
functions, whereas for the estimated errors only 60% of
the points lie within at least one of those intervals. Our
numerical results are summarized in table 1.
d = 1 d = 2
M = 0 M = 0.5 M = 0 M = 0.5
cM 0.347 ± 0.001 0.362 ± 0.001 0.163 ± 0.001 0.161 ± 0.001
ν−
‖
2.01 ± 0.02 2.00 ± 0.02 1.23 ± 0.08 1.27 ± 0.05
ν+‖ 1.99 ± 0.03 1.99 ± 0.02 1.26 ± 0.05 1.25 ± 0.1
ν−⊥ 0.996 ± 0.007 0.999 ± 0.002 0.733 ± 0.004 0.74 ± 0.01
ν+⊥ 0.998 ± 0.008 1.001 ± 0.002 0.739 ± 0.008 0.74 ± 0.01
β 0.02 ± 0.02 0.04 ± 0.04 0.56 ± 0.03 0.56 ± 0.09
β′ 1.01 ± 0.02 0.92 ± 0.2 0.57 ± 0.08 0.6 ± 0.1
TABLE I: Summary of the measured critical exponents in
one and two dimensions, and for two different mobility rates,
M = 0 and M = 0.5.
The measured exponents indicate that the phase tran-
sition belongs to the voter model universality class in one
dimension, where the scaling exponents corresponding to
the population fraction, the survival probability, the clus-
ter size and the temporal correlations are given by β = 0,
β′ = 1, ν‖ = 2 and ν⊥ = 1 in one dimension [45–47].
In fact, there are many similarities to the Voter Model,
like two absorbing phases, compact clusters and the ab-
sence of an active phase. The two-dimensional system
apparently belongs to the universality class of directed
percolation (DP). For this class, β = β′ = 0.584(4),
ν‖ = 1.295(6) and ν⊥ = 0.734(4) [44]. Interestingly,
in contrast to DP, the dynamics violates the condition
of a unique absorbing state. Moreover, in contrast to
other known DP class models [48, 49], the model does
not show a fluctuating active phase. The existence of an
active phase seems not to be a necessary condition for
the DP universality class.
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In summary, we have investigated the impact of mo-
bility on the evolution of cooperation. Importantly, by
introducing a separated fitness collection dynamics we
accounted for the biological fact that fitness is the result
of many underlying processes. Only by this fitness col-
lection dynamics, the correct asymptotic limits for van-
ishing and large mobility, the spatial and the well-mixed
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma are obtained. While
in two dimensions, spatial structure alone is sufficient to
promote cooperation, the memory of past interactions is
a necessary condition for cooperation in one dimension.
In fact, memory effects can be seen as an additional mech-
anism favoring cooperation – and they are expected to oc-
cur even in simple organisms, since their fitness depends
on several interactions with their environment. Memory
effects have already been found to promote cooperation
in a deterministic game [16, 50]. The present study con-
firms this finding for a stochastic setup and shows that
they are of essential importance in one dimension.
For a certain intermediate mobility (depending on ben-
efit and costs) there is a critical phase transition without
stable coexistence, both in one and in two dimensions.
Below critical mobilities and costs only cooperators re-
main while above only free-riders remain in the long run.
This phase transition is robust against changes of dynam-
ical details, like a limited payoff collection capability.
More importantly, for cooperation to prevail in the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma, the time-scale of mobility must
always be of the same order or lower as the selection
time-scale. If one considers for example microbial popu-
lations, the spatial prisoner’s dilemma can only explain
cooperation if the reproduction time of the microbes un-
der consideration is of the same order as the time they
need to move to a neighboring bacterium. This condi-
tion is probably not fulfilled in most ecological situations.
Thus, at least in its standard formulation, the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma might serve as a placative example
to explain how spatial clustering can promote coopera-
tion in principle. But it cannot serve as a substantive
explanation for cooperative behavior in natural popula-
tions. In microbial populations, more complex clustering
of microbes into different colonies, the coupling to growth
dynamics, and the dynamical restructuring of the popula-
tion on larger length scales are probably more important
for the evolution and sustainment of cooperative strains
[3, 26, 51–60].
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